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The construction industry has in recent years witnessed a paradigm shift towards the 
use of more collaborative contracting relationships and integrated processes in an 
attempt to improve construction project delivery. Trust is central to the success of 
these contracting approaches and although efforts are usually aimed at improving trust 
relations in client-contractor relationships, there has so far been mixed findings on 
how trust is influenced by formal control mechanisms discharged via formal 
contracts.  In construction contracting, there is therefore the need to investigate how 
different governance modes and control mechanisms deployed on construction 
projects are perceived by those being controlled and how this in turn influences trust. 
Through a critique of the extant literature on trust and control in construction, this 
study reveals that the trust-control relationship which can be both complimentary and 
supplementary has far reaching implications on the measurement/assessment of trust 
in the construction project context. The orientation of governance and control 
mechanisms selected by clients and the behavioural consequences of these from 
contractors can thus be used as a measure of the degree of trust that exists in the dyad.  
Keywords: client-contractor relationship, control mechanisms, governance modes, 
trust. 
INTRODUCTION 
The use of control mechanisms on construction projects by clients and their 
representatives have increasingly become a social dynamically constructed process 
that largely depends on perceived degree of trust in client-contractor relationships. To 
therefore enforce a given mode of governance, project managers discharge a variety of 
control mechanisms, some of which are sometimes not specified in the contract 
documents. Although these control mechanisms are goal oriented, they can either 
enhance trust development in the client-contractor dyad or cause it to degenerate. It is 
argued that the trust-control nexus presents the potential for developing a method that 
can be used to assess trust in the client-contractor dyad based on the prevailing control 
mechanisms. In inter-organisational management and construction management 
research, studies conducted on trust relationships have often employed scales which 
investigate a range of conditions that activate and sustain trust (Smyth, 2008, Butler, 
1991, Smyth, 2006). Given the potential correlation between trust in an exchange 
relationship, governance modes and the variety of control mechanisms that are 
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discharged, this study examines literature to explore further the trust-control nexus in 
client-contractor relationships on construction.  
The study begins with a critical examination of the constructs of trust and control, 
trust and inter-organisational governance modes. This is followed by a discussion on 
the implications of the trust, control and inter-organisational governance relationships 
for the assessment of trust in the construction project context.  
AN EXAMINATION OF TRUST AND CONTROL 
Formal contracts irrespective of their complexity are unable to provide solutions to all 
contractual problems that may arise on a construction project. The uncertainties that 
characterise construction which can range from changes in user needs, errors and 
omissions in design drawings and specifications to changes in weather and ground 
conditions have often been said to provide enough avenues for contractors to act 
opportunistically by pricing excessively for extra work. This thinking mostly makes 
clients and their representatives on projects feel vulnerable to contractors that they 
concentrate much more on safeguarding their investments should things go wrong 
instead of proactively promoting trust and cooperative relations in the client-
contractor dyad (Kadefors, 2004). This usually results in an antagonistic relationship 
between clients and contractors that can degenerate into conflicts (Kadefors, 2004) 
and disputes. The potential problems which often arise after contract formalization 
have made it necessary for contractual provisions to be supported with the 
implementation of other informal and socially constructed control mechanisms. Trust 
is very instrumental to the effective functioning of both formal and informal control 
mechanisms (Costa and Bijlsma-Frankema, 2007). It plays a significant role on the 
choice of governance mode to be adopted in a given circumstance (Poppo and Zenger, 
2002), the variety of control mechanisms selected to establish the chosen governance 
mode, and the effectiveness of control mechanisms in terms of performance resulting 
from the reaction/behaviour of party being controlled. Thus a variety of control 
mechanisms which also aim to build and maintain trust on construction projects are 
employed in the management of construction projects although some might not be 
contractually specified. The use of control mechanisms and managerial influence 
strategies on construction projects have therefore been referred to as a very complex 
and dynamic socially constructed process which demands further investigation using 
appropriate theories that accommodate social roles and statuses (Badenfelt, 2010). 
Although co-operation can be achieved through coercion (Kadefors, 2004) where 
contractors would only exhibit compliance, cooperation achieved through trust has a 
far reaching positive influence on project performance (cf. Cheung et al., 2011) since 
such forms of cooperation result in more constructive interactions that add overall 
value to projects. Thus trust, which has always been a research focus in organisational 
and inter-organisational management, has consistently been receiving growing 
attention in construction management research. Although trust definitions have 
originated from economics, psychology, sociology, and philosophy perspectives, a 
common theme is that trust is an underlying psychological state that informs 
behaviour. This psychological state comprises the intention of a party to accept 
vulnerability based on the positive expectations of the intentions or behaviours of 
other parties (Costa and Bijlsma-Frankema, 2007; Weibel, 2007; Dekker, 2004; Das 
and Teng, 2001). In project settings, trust has been described as a disposition or 
attitude that informs the willingness of a party to rely on or be vulnerable to actions of 
another party under circumstances of contractual and social obligations and with 
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opportunities for collaboration (Smyth et al., 2010). Trust, although being a 
psychological state is therefore very important to relationships because it directly 
influences actions and behaviours of parties in an exchange relationship. 
Control on the other hand has been described as all systems and devices employed to 
ensure that acts, behaviours, outcome and devices of individuals, teams and 
organisations are consistent with meeting organisational or project goals, objectives 
and strategies (Tuuli et al., 2010a). These controls are either formal (outcome or 
behaviour control) or in-formal/social controls which are more implicit (Tuuli et al., 
2010a, Tuuli et al., 2010b). The use of controls on construction projects are also 
geared towards specific performance goals (Tuuli et al., 2010b). Also, decisions that 
inform the appropriate governance mode to adopt and corresponding control 
mechanisms to implement depend on perceived exchange hazards (Das and Teng, 
2001). Research has revealed that increases in these exchange hazards encourage the 
use of more complex contracts and control mechanisms (Poppo and Zenger, 2002). 
These exchange hazards which include increases in asset specificity, uncertainty, 
frequency of transactions, task complexity, and difficulty in performance 
measurement are however influenced by trust or can influence trust in an exchange 
relationship (Poppo and Zenger, 2002). This iterative inter-dependence therefore 
provides the vital link between the choice of governance mode, the variety of control 
mechanisms implemented and trust between exchange parties.  
Although most researchers (Das and Teng, 1998; Möllering, 2005; Badenfelt, 2010) 
have theoretically viewed trust and control as parallel concepts which always assume 
each others existence - the duality perspective - trust has sometimes been viewed as a 
form of control mechanism in itself (Bradach and Eccles, 1989; Bachmann, 2001). 
However, in this study, the duality perspective of control is adopted as in reality, 
control mechanisms affect trust levels and the degree of trust existent in a relationship 
both moderates and influences the level of control (Das and Teng, 1998). This 
perspective is also consistent with arguments that support a complimentary rather than 
supplementary relationship between trust and control (cf. Poppo and Zenger, 2002). 
GOVERNANCE MODES, CONTROL MECHANISMS AND 
TRUST 
Transaction processes have traditionally been based on arms-length agreements where 
inter-organisational exchange relationships are mainly governed by market, 
hierarchical or hybrid (a combination of market and hierarchical) governance modes. 
Transaction cost economic (TCE) theory has often been used to understand how 
governance arrangements are crafted in inter-organisational relationships in relation to 
perceived exchange hazards. It has often been advocated by TCE researchers that the 
governance mode which provides the most optimum cost i.e. cost of setting up 
governance, cost of evaluation, and cost of control (Nooteboom, 1996) is selected to 
match the perceived exchange hazards such as asset specificity, difficulty in 
performance measurement, uncertainty (Poppo and Zenger, 2002) and frequency of 
transaction (Kumaraswamy et al., 2008). Thus, in the presence of high asset 
specificity, high uncertainty, and high frequency of transaction, hierarchical 
governance through authority and power differentials and market governance through 
price have been suggested as the most efficient (Poppo and Zenger, 2002). Market 
governance is however most suitable for occasional, standardized and simple 
transactions (Eriksson, 2010).  
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The TCE framework is however more supportive of traditional approaches to 
construction procurement where lump-sum contracts are often used. This is because 
TCE theory emphasises even in relation to trust and cooperation, that economic self-
interest is the main motivator of positive human behaviour (Kadefors, 2004). 
Researchers have often criticised TCE theory’s approach to inter-organisational 
governance as being too pessimistic in nature as there is the tendency for economic 
self-interest behaviours to be overestimated whilst ignoring the reality of cooperative 
behaviours that result purely from social recognition, roles, norms and status 
(Kadefors, 2004). Another governance mode which has also been recognised 
somewhat by TCE researchers is relational governance. Since inter-organisational 
exchanges are embedded in social relationships (Poppo and Zenger, 2002), relational 
governance emerges from agreed upon processes, values and norms that the exchange 
relationship is embedded in. Relational governance also functions through trust 
(Poppo and Zenger, 2002) just as market and hierarchal governance functions through 
price and authority respectively. The transaction cost in relational governance is 
therefore the cost of trust building (Kumaraswamy et al., 2008).  
TCE theory, being a rational theory however views trust from a self-interested 
economic perspective whilst ignoring social roles and status, social recognition and 
meaningful work (Kadefors, 2004). Badenfelt (2010) reiterated the need to search for 
more useful theories that best explain social roles and status in the management of 
projects whereas Kumaraswamy et al., (2008) suggested that the TCE framework was 
an inadequate guiding theory for contracting. In search of other theories beyond 
traditional TCE theory, Macneil’s relational contract theory which gives more 
recognition to the role of social norms in promoting positive behaviours in exchange 
relationships has emerged as a suitable theory that underpins contracting 
(Kumaraswamy et al., 2008). Macneil’s relational contract theory which is based on a 
social theory of human exchange views legally enforceable contracts as a continuum 
of discrete contracts i.e. contracts where all the terms have been explicitly and 
unambiguously expressed during contract formation, and implicit contracts which are 
guided by agreed set of norms and behavioural patterns that project exchanges into the 
future (Barnett, 1992). The root source of these implicit norms and behavioural 
patterns are the social relations within which human actions are constituted and from 
which they exist and evolve over a long period of time (Barnett, 1992). To project 
economic exchanges into the future, firms engaged in a transaction contract would 
therefore suppress their short-term self-interest in pursuit of long-term self-interests by 
adopting cooperative attitudes (Kumaraswamy et al., 2008). 
Governance modes i.e. market, hierarchical, hybrid or relational, are effected in 
transactions by implementing a range of control mechanisms. With market 
governance, the main focus of control is price and control mechanisms are therefore 
implemented to control output during exchange performance so as to ensure that price 
is kept within acceptable limits. With hierarchal governance, control mechanisms are 
initiated and discharged through authority and power differentials during exchange 
performance. Hybrid modes of governance are achieved by implementing a variety of 
control mechanisms that consist of output control through price and process control 
through authority so as to achieve pre-determined project objectives. These control 
mechanisms are however mostly formalised and often specified in contract documents 
to safeguard economic exchanges. Market, hierarchical or hybrid governance modes 
implemented through output and process control have traditionally been the principal 
modes of governance in construction contracting until more recently where relational 
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governance has also gained popularity. Relational governance has been suggested to 
be suitable for complex and repetitive transactions (Eriksson, 2010). Also, relational 
governance has consistently been linked to informal/social control modes as this 
governance mode depends to a larger extent on trust levels between exchange partners 
(Eriksson and Nilsson, 2008). 
Trust has also been described as a shifting parameter between these governance modes 
(Gulati and Nickerson, 2008). Thus, since perceived trust in an exchange relationship 
influences the choice of governance mode to adopt for a given transaction, trust 
should in theory ensure that the most optimum choice of governance mode is adopted. 
Furthermore, cost of governance has significant impact on exchange performance, 
given that all things being equal, cost performance increases when governance costs 
are lower (Gulati and Nickerson, 2008). The choice of a less costly governance mode 
facilitated by pre-existing trust should therefore have the potential to improve cost 
performance. Trust can therefore play a significant role not only in facilitating 
relational governance but also on the choice of the most appropriate governance mode 
for an exchange relationship and the effectiveness of the variety of control 
mechanisms implemented to achieve such governance modes.  
Table 1: Control types and governance mechanisms in client-contractor relationships 
(Adapted from Eriksson and Laan, 2007) 
 
Buying stage 
Control focus/orientation 
Price focus through 
output control 
Authority focus 
through process 
control 
Trust focus through 
social control 
Specification Specification by client Specification by 
client 
Joint specification 
Bid invitation Open bid procedure Limited bid invitation Limited bid invitation 
Bid evaluation Focus on tender price Focus on authority-
based soft parameters 
Focus on trust-based 
soft parameters 
Project delivery 
Contract formalization 
 
Formal, comprehensive 
contracts 
 
Formal, 
comprehensive 
contracts 
 
Informal and 
incomplete contracts 
(Charters) 
Type of compensation Fixed price Reimbursements Including incentives 
Collaborative tools Low usage of 
collaborative tools 
Low usage of 
collaborative tools 
High usage of 
collaborative tools 
Performance evaluation Output control by client Process control by 
client 
Self-control by 
contractor 
 
Kumaraswamy et al., (2008) however suggested that these governance modes and 
their operational derivatives i.e. price, authority and trust are not mutually exclusive in 
reality as they can be combined in a variety of ways to achieve project objectives. In 
the construction project context, control mechanisms which can be implemented at 
different stages of the buying process have been shown in Table 1.The problem which 
arises is how control mechanisms implemented via price and authority influences trust 
development and hence relational governance. This is in the perspective of trust being 
a product of control related actions. Secondly, in the capacity of trust being a shifting 
parameter that determines the choice of a governance mode (i.e. pre-existing trust 
being a cause of control action), the realistic selection of various control mechanisms - 
which in some instances are non-contractual and socially constructed - to ensure that 
not more than necessary control mechanisms are discharged requires more detailed 
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investigation. This is because some control mechanisms might not be value adding to 
the project and others might be harmful to the development and sustainability of trust. 
IMPLICATIONS OF TRUST-CONTROL RELATIONSHIP FOR 
THE ASSESSMENT OF TRUST 
It has been discussed in the above sections that based on the orientation of governance 
mode, a variety of control mechanisms are selected and operationalised through a 
focus on price, authority or trust. Trust also plays a crucial role in both the choice of 
governance mode and effectiveness of control mechanisms discharged and hence its 
strong correlation with control. For example, a shift in performance evaluation of 
projects from the traditional reliance on extensive end-inspections of finished work 
towards more reliance on contractor’s self-control whiles executing limited random 
end inspections  can be a testament to the degree of trust that the client has in the 
competence and integrity of a contractor (cf. Eriksson and Laan, 2007). It has also 
been reported that clients adopt several control mechanisms on projects which are 
predominantly associated with hybrid (hierarchical and market) governance modes 
through authority and price (Eriksson and Laan, 2007) without being able to fully 
exploit the maximum potential of relational governance approaches due to lack of 
trust . This situation can also result in a spiral of distrust as control mechanisms and 
established governance mode in the relationship may indicate from the onset, a lack of 
trust. The importance of trust therefore makes its effective measurement very useful to 
the management of projects as this would help monitor its development and 
sustainability.  
Trust has mostly been assessed using scales which measure the presence of conditions 
upon which trust can be said to exist. As a result, researchers have developed and 
ranked different conditions of trust which are then used to infer the presence and 
degree of trust in key relationships (cf. Smyth, 2006). This has however not been 
without inconsistencies as findings on which particular conditions demonstrate the 
presence of trust have been ambivalent (Smyth, 2006). Seppanen et al (2007) also 
reported major inconsistencies in the operationalization and measurement of trust for 
which they called for more empirical research on trust measurement in inter-
organisational relationships. In construction project contexts, the presence of these 
conditions may be acknowledged to signal the existence of trust in a given 
relationship whereas in reality, there may be no trust. Based on the duality perspective 
of trust and control as mentioned earlier, and the role of trust in influencing control 
and governance, a trust assessment tool can be developed. Thus, control mechanisms 
implemented on projects can become the major conduit for such an assessment.  The 
link between orientations of governance, control mechanism, behaviour/actions of 
contractors and the degree of trust which has been illustrated in Figure 1 can therefore 
provide a theoretical basis for developing such a tool for trust assessment. To 
empirically investigate this link, the critical incident technique (cf. Flanagan, 1954) 
can be used to identify instances on previous projects where governance and control 
mechanisms beyond those needed for co-ordination of interrelated tasks, could be 
linked to the perceived degree of trust.   
Tuuli et al., (2010b) in their research echoed a preliminary link between in-
formal/self-control mechanisms and behavioural consequences that resulted in project 
performance within the Hong Kong construction industry. They referred to self-
control as an important driver in engendering positive outcomes for individuals, teams 
and organisations especially in complex and uncertain work settings that characterises 
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construction projects. Badenfelt, (2010) also recently identified, from a longitudinal 
case-study of a high-technology laboratory construction in Sweden, how a number of 
more informal and subtle control mechanisms employed on the project helped in 
building and sustaining trust. In such instances, there is high trust between the client 
and contractor which translates into positive behaviour or actions. These can include 
correcting problems and deficiencies when they occur with less regard for who caused 
it or who will pay for it, suggesting value adding alternatives and cost saving options 
etc. This is not to ignore the fact that some of the governance modes and socially 
constructed control strategies which aim to establish and maintain trust can also be 
intuitively appealing but in reality present hidden drawbacks (Kadefors, 2004). On the 
other instance, when governance modes and control mechanisms are perceived as 
more stringent, this could initiate a perception in a contractor that the client does not 
trust in their integrity or competence (Smyth, 2003). This perception could then 
initiate certain behaviours and actions in reaction to the perceived lack of trust in them 
such as for example, not been too keen on proposing value addition and cost saving 
options like in the earlier instance (cf. Smyth et al., 2010).Take for example, a 
relationship governed mainly by a hierarchal mode of governance which focuses 
mostly on establishing remedies and penalties for non-compliance, it becomes more 
difficult to achieve added value for the project as contractors act with more caution 
(Matthews and Howell, 2005). As put by Matthews and Howell (2005), “it is hard to 
have a wholesome relationship with another when you have a charge of dynamite 
around your neck and the other holds the detonator”.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Interactions between trust, governance and control and contractor behaviour 
 
Drawing on the above, the behavioural response of contractors to control mechanisms 
from theoretical perspectives, could be used as a measure of the extent to which they 
feel trusted and also how well they trust the client or their representatives. The 
orientation of governance and implemented control mechanisms could also be used as 
a measure of the degree to which a client trusts in the integrity and competence of a 
contractor.  Indeed, this possibility of assessing trust through governance modes and 
control mechanisms presents a potential opportunity for improving trust in client-
contractor relationships. This will however benefit from further studies to (1) establish 
empirically the reliability of the orientation of governance and control mechanisms as 
a measure/reflection of degree of trust, and then (2) to possibly map out how different 
governance modes and control mechanisms relate to different measures/degree of 
trust.   
Degree of trust in          
relationship 
Clients’ choice of 
governance and 
control  
Action/behaviour 
and attitudes of 
contractor 
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CONCLUSIONS 
The duality perspective, where trust and control are viewed as parallel concepts which 
always assume each others existence, requires that to achieve best performance in 
exchange relationships, control and trust act complimentarily. Although this may 
present a major problem on how the best balance can be achieved to obtain an overall 
positive influence on project performance, this relationship can be instrumental in the 
study and understanding of trust in the construction project context. It has therefore 
been argued that the duality perspective of trust and control presents an opportunity 
for the development of an action based method of measuring trust in construction 
project contexts. This complimentary relationship in the construction project context 
is such that control mechanisms affect trust levels and the degree of trust existent in a 
relationship also influences the level of control. Project clients or their representatives 
therefore adopt governance modes which reflect the degree of trust they have in the 
contractor. They proceed to establish these governance modes by selecting a variety of 
control mechanisms, some of which emerge from the social interaction process and 
hence may not even be specified in contract documents. Contractors on the other 
hand, exhibit patterns of behaviour and actions which are based on their perceptions 
towards governance modes and control mechanisms imposed on them. Since these 
governance and control issues from both client and contractor’s perspective are linked 
to their perceptions of trust, an investigation into behaviours and actions on projects 
that relate to governance and control can be undertaken using the critical incident 
technique. Findings from such studies can be very useful for the development of a tool 
to measure trust in the client-contractor dyad. 
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